Cp  970.75] 

Able  I  THE  CAPTURE  OP  FORT   FISHER, 

by 
Adelbert  Ames 
in 
Civil  War  Papers, Command ry  of  Mass. V.  1,1900 


€&e  ili&rarp 

aim 

Uniumtv  of  fftotib  Carolina 


Collection  of  i^ortfi  Caroliniana 

<SntiotoEt!  bg 

3oim  ^prunt  Ml 

of  tfoe  Classss  of  1889 


Cp 


°)T0.75 


THE   CAPTURE   OF  FORT  FISHER 


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THE   CAPTURE   OF   FORT   FISHER 

BY 

BREVET  MAJOR   GENERAL  ADELBERT  AMES,  U.S.V. 

PART  I. 

About  the  first  of  December,  1864,  when  in  command  of 
the  Third  Division,  Twenty-fourth  Corps,  of  the  Army  of  the 
James,  then  before  Richmond,  Va.,  I  was  notified  I  had  been 
selected  to  lead  my  division  in  a  movement,  by  sea,  against 
some  point  of  the  Confederacy  on  the  Atlantic  coast. 

At  that  time  Wilmington,  N.C.,  was  the  port  through 
which  the  Confederacy  received  a  large  part  of  its  munitions  of 
war,  and  whence  was  shipped  to  England,  in  payment  therefor, 
much  of  its  cotton  and  tobacco.  Wilmington  was  situated  on 
the  east  bank  of  the  Cape  Fear  River,  thirty  miles  from  its 
mouth,  which  was  guarded  by  Fort  Fisher. 

Our  Navy  was  untiring  in  its  efforts  to  blockade  that  port, 
but  was  not  successful. 

The  order  from  General  Butler  to  General  Weitzel  relative 
to  the  expedition  December  6th,  1864,  was:  "The  Major 
General  commanding  has  entrusted  you  with  the  command  of 
the  expedition  about  to  embark  for  the  North  Carolina  coast. 
It  will  consist  of  sixty-five  hundred  infantry,  two  batteries  and 
fifty  cavalry.  The  effective  men  of  General  Ames's  division  of 
the  Twenty-fourth  Corps  will  furnish  the  infantry  force. 
General  Paine  is  under  your  orders  and  General  Ames  will  be 
ordered  to  report  to  you  in  person  immediately." 

My  division,  of  three  brigades,  was  composed  of  New  Hamp- 
shire, New  York,  Pennsylvania,  and  Indiana  troops,  about  thirty- 
three  hundred  in  number.  General  Paine  had  a  division  of 
colored  troops. 

271 


272  CIVIL  WAR  PAPERS 

We  embarked  at  Bermuda  Hundreds,  Va.,  December  8th, 
and  our  transports  reached  the  place  of  rendezvous  off  New- 
Inlet,  N.C.,  Thursday,  the  15th.  Friday,  Saturday,  and  Sun- 
day, we  awaited  the  coming  of  the  Navy. 

Admiral  Porter,  commanding  our  fleet,  arrived  Sunday 
evening,  the  i8thv  The  next  day  the  water  was  too  rough  to 
make  a  landing  on  the  ocean  beach.  Towards  evening  a  north- 
east gale  coming  up,  the  transports  were  sent  to  Beaufort  for 
coal  and  water,  as  the  ten  days'  supply  had  run  short,  where 
they  were  delayed  by  the  weather  and  the  difficulty  of  getting 
coal,  until  Saturday,  the  24th. 

I  did  not  go  to  Beaufort,  as  my  ship,  on  which  was  one  of 
my  brigades,  was  well  prepared  for  such  an  emergency. 

General  Butler,  followed  by  his  fleet  of  transports,  returned 
to  New  Inlet  on  Saturday,  the  24th  of  December,  between  four 
and  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 

The  powder  boat,  which  played  such  a  notorious  part  in  this 
expedition,  had  been  exploded  at  about  two  o'clock  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  same  day. 

The  idea  of  the  powder  boat  was  General  Butler's,  but  it  was 
approved  of  and  adopted  by  the  Navy,  which  furnished  the  vessel 
and  its  share  of  the  two  hundred  and  fifteen  tons  of  gun-powder 
used.    The  Navy  held  control  of  this  experiment  from  first  to  last. 

The  explosion  was  untimely,  and  a  failure.  Commodore 
Jeffers  of  the  Navy  reports :  "A  part  of  the  programme  re- 
quired that  the  vessel  should  be  grounded,  which  appears  not  to 
have  been  the  case." 

Commander  Rhind  writes  :  "  That,  owing  to  the  want  of 
confinement  and  insufficient  fusing  of  the  mass,  much  of  the 
powder  was  blown  away  before  ignition  and  its  effect  lost." 

Admiral  Porter  reports :  "  That  the  powder  was  finally 
exploded  from  the  effects  of  a  fire  kindled  in  the  forecastle. 
No  results  of  value  were  to  be  expected  from  this  mode.  It  was 
proposed  only  as  a  final  resort,  in  order  to  prevent  the  vessel, 
in  any  contingency,  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy." 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    FORT    FISHER  273 

Commander  James  Parker,  U.  S.  Navy,  stated  to  the  New 
York  Loyal  Legion,  October  5,  1892  :  "We  all  believed  in  it  (the 
powder  boat)  from  the  Admiral  down,  but  when  it  proved  so 
laughable  a  failure  we,  of  the  Navy,  laid  its  paternity  upon 
General  Butler." 

Colonel  Lamb,  in  command,  describes  Fort  Fisher  as  fol- 
lows :  "  At  the  land-face  of  Fort  Fisher  the  peninsula  was  about 
half  a  mile  wide,  Cape  Fear  River  being  on  one  side  and  the 
Atlantic  Ocean  on  the  other.  This  face  commenced  about  a 
hundred  feet  from  the  river  with  a  half  bastion,  and  extended 
with  a  heavy  curtain  to  a  full  bastion  on  the  ocean  side,  where 
it  joined  the  sea-face.  The  work  was  built  to  withstand  the 
heaviest  artillery  fire.  The  outer  slope  was  twenty  feet  high 
from  the  berm  to  the  top  of  the  parapet,  at  an  angle  of  forty- 
five  degrees,  and  was  sodded  with  marsh  grass,  which  grew 
luxuriantly.  The  parapet  was  not  less  than  twenty-five  feet 
thick,  with  an  inclination  of  only  one  foot.  The  revetment  was 
five  feet  nine  inches  high,  from  the  floor  of  the  gun  chambers, 
and  these  were  some  twelve  feet  or  more  from  the  interior 
plane.  The  guns  were  all  mounted  in  barbette,  Columbiad  car- 
riages ;  there  was  not  a  single  casemated  gun  in  the  fort.  Be- 
tween the  gun  chambers,  containing  one  or  two  guns  each 
(there  were  twenty  heavy  guns  on  the  land-face),  there  were  " 
(some  eighteen)  "  heavy  traverses,  exceeding  in  size  any  known 
to  engineers,  to  protect  from  an  enfilading  fire.  They  extended 
out  some  twelve  feet  on  the  parapet,  running  back  thirty  feet 
or  more.  The  gun  chambers  were  reached  from  the  rear  by 
steps.  In  each  traverse  was  an  alternate  magazine  or  bomb- 
proof, the  latter  ventilated  by  an  air-chamber.  Passageways 
penetrated  the  traverses  in  the  interior  of  the  work,  forming 
additional  bomb-proofs  for  the  reliefs  of  the  guns. 

"The  sea-face  was  a  mile  long,  and  for  a  hundred  yards 
from  the  northeast  bastion  was  of  the  same  massive  character  as 
the  land-face. 

"  As  a  defence  against  infantry  there  was  a  system  of  sub- 


2/4  CIVIL   WAR  PAPERS 

terre  torpedoes  extending  across  the  peninsula,  five  to  six  hun- 
dred feet  from  the  land-face,  and  so  disconnected  that  an 
explosion  of  one  would  not  affect  the  others ;  inside  the  torpe- 
does, about  fifty  feet  from  the  berm  of  the  work,  extending 
from  the  river  bank  to  the  seashore,  was  a  heavy  palisade  of 
sharpened  logs  nine  feet  high,  pierced  for  musketry,  and  so  laid 
out  as  to  have  an  enfilading  fire  on  the  centre,  where  there  was 
a  redoubt  guarding  a  sally-port  from  which  two  Napoleons  were 
run  out  as  occasion  required.  At  the  river  end  of  the  palisade 
was  a  deep  and  muddy  slough,  across  which  was  a  bridge,  the 
entrance  on  the  river  road  into  the  fort ;  commanding  this 
bridge  was  a  Napoleon  gun.  There  were  three  mortars  in  rear 
of  the  land-face." 

This  strong  work  had,  at  the  time  of  our  first  expedition,  a 
garrison  of  fourteen  hundred  men,  nine  hundred  of  whom  were 
veterans. 

Colonel  Lamb  had  been  incited  to  the  utmost  by  General 
Lee,  who  had  sent  him  word  that  he  "must  hold  the  fort  or  he 
could  not  subsist  his  army." 

On  the  morning  of  the  24th  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Porter 
moved  in  towards  New  Inlet  and  opened  fire  on  the  fort.  The 
character  of  this  bombardment  and  the  demands  made  by  the 
Admiral  on  his  ships  and  sailors  I  will  let  him  tell. 

In  his  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  of  the  24th  of 
December,  1864,  he  says:  "I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you 
that  I  attacked  the  forts  at  the  mouth  of  the  Cape  Fear  River 
to-day  at  12.30.  .  .  .  After  getting  the  ships  in  position  we 
silenced  it  in  about  an  hour  and  a  half,  there  being  no  troops 
here  to  take  possession.  I  am  merely  firing  now  to  keep  up 
practice.  The  forts  are  nearly  demolished,  and  as  soon  as 
troops  come  we  can  take  possession.  We  have  set  them  on  fire, 
blown  some  of  them  up,  and  all  that  is  wanted  now  is  troops  to 
land  and  go  into  them."  The  Admiral  failed  to  mention,  in  his 
letter,  the  fact  that  I  had  offered  one  thousand  men  and  co- 
operation, although,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on 


THE   CAPTURE    OF   FORT   FISHER  275 

the  Conduct  of  the  War,  he  said  :  "  General  Ames  had  a  thou- 
sand men  there,  and  he  sent  on  board  and  told  me  he  was  ready- 
to  land." 

In  his  letter  of  the  26th  he  says,  referring  to  the  bombard- 
ment of  the  24th  :  "  In  an  hour  and  fifteen  minutes  after  the 
first  shot  was  fired  not  a  shot  came  from  the  fort.  Finding  that 
the  batteries  were  silenced  completely  I  directed  the  ships  to 
keep  up  a  moderate  fire  in  hopes  of  attracting  the  attention  of 
the  transports  and  bringing  them  in."  In  this  same  letter  of 
December  26th  Admiral  Porter  says,  speaking  of  the  bombard- 
ment of  the  forts  on  December  25th :  "  The  firing  this  day  was 
slow,  only  sufficient  to  amuse  the  enemy  while  the  army  landed. 
In  the  bombardment  of  the  25  th  the  men  were  engaged  firing 
slowly  for  seven  hours.  .  .  .  Everything  was  coolly  done 
throughout  the  day,  and  I  witnessed  some  beautiful  practice." 

In  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  December  29, 
after  the  fleet  had  left  and  the  transports  had  gone  back  to 
Hampton  Roads,  he  writes  :  "  At  no  time  did  I  permit  the  ves- 
sels to  open  on  them  with  all  their  batteries,  limiting  some  of 
them  to  about  two  shots  a  minute,  and  permitting  the  large 
vessels  to  fight  only  one  division  of  guns  at  a  time  ;  and  the 
bombardment  cost  only  a  certain  amount  of  shells,  which  I 
would  expend  in  a  month's  target  practice  anyhow."  Such  are 
the  salient  features  of  the  reports  of  Admiral  Porter. 

General  Whiting,  who  was  in  the  fort,  and  who  commanded 
that  military  district,  says  the  slight  damage  done  by  this 
cannonading  was  repaired  at  night,  and  that  "the  garrison 
was  in  no  instance  driven  from  its  guns,  the  palisade  was  in 
perfect  order,  and  the  mines  the  same,  the  wires  not  having 
been  cut." 

General  Weitzel  testified  before  the  Committee  on  the  Con- 
duct of  the  War :  "  I  made  a  reconnoissance  of  the  fort  and  saw 
that  the  work,  as  a  defensive  work,  was  not  injured  at  all,  except 
that  one  gun  about  midway  of  the  land  face  was  dismounted. 
I  did  not  see  a  single  opening  in  the  row  of  palisades  that  was 


276  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

in  front  of  the  ditch;  it  seemed  to  be  perfectly  intact."  All  in 
the  fort  agree  that  Admiral  Porter  was  mistaken  as  to  the  effects 
of  the  cannonading. 

So  much  as  to  the  condition  of  the  fort. 

On  the  morning  of  the  25th  all  our  transports  anchored 
near  the  shore  some  two  or  three  miles  north  of  the  fort,  and 
the  troops  immediately  began  to  land. 

I  had  been  selected  to  storm  the  fort  with  my  division. 

My  report  on  December  28th  is  as  follows:  "Brevet  Brigadier 
General  Curtis  and  five  hundred  of  his  brigade  were  the  first  to 
land,  and  were  taken  towards  the  fort  by  General  Weitzel  for  a 
reconnoissance.  ...  It  was  dusk  when  I  reached  the  front. 
I  then  heard  that  the  First  Brigade  was  to  remain  where  it  was 
until  further  orders,  and  that  if  any  attack  was  made  the  respon- 
sibility would  rest  with  the  officer  in  immediate  command.  At 
this  time  I  did  not  know  that  it  had  been  decided  not  to  attack 
the  fort.  Upon  the  report  of  Curtis  that  he  could  take  the 
fort  I  sent  his  brigade  forward  to  make  the  attempt."  In  his 
report  Curtis  says  :  "  On  my  arrival  at  this  point  I  received 
orders  from  General  Ames  to  return  and  re-establish  my  lines  as 
they  were,  and,  if  possible,  to  occupy  the  fort,  and  I  at  once 
ordered  my  skirmishers  forward,  etc.  .  .  .  The  enemy,  having 
cover  of  the  darkness,  opened  on  the  skirmishers  as  they  ad- 
vanced with  musketry  and  canister,  but  did  not  prevent  their 
establishing  the  line  in  its  former  position,  with  the  reserves  in 
close  proximity."  Curtis  made  no  further  effort  to  take  the 
fort,  as  I  had  ordered  him  to  do,  but  sent  word  to  me  that 
he  was  "  occupying  his  former  position."  Why  he  failed  to 
assault  the  fort  after  I  assumed  the  responsibility  and  gave 
the  order  I  have  never  known.  At  this  time  an  order  reached 
me  to  return  to  our  ships,  which  we  did,  and  the  first  expedition 
ended. 

An  incident  occurred  which  had  much  to  do  in  giving  an 
erroneous  idea  of  the  condition  of  the  fort  and  garrison. 

One  of  our  lieutenants  approached  the  fort  and  captured  its 


THE    CAPTURE    OF   FORT    FISHER  277 

flag,  which  had  been  shot  away  by  the  Navy,  and  which  had 
fallen  with  the  flag  staff  on  the  outer  slope  of  the  parapet  to  the 
ditch. 

On  this  point  General  Weitzel  testifies  :  "  I  sent  for  Lieu- 
tenant Walling  and  questioned  him  about  it,  and  he  told  me  that 
a  shell  had  knocked  the  flagstaff  outside  and  on  top  of  the 
parapet,  and  the  flag  hung  over  into  or  outside  of  the  ditch. 
Thinking  that  probably  the  rebels  had  not  observed  it,  he  crept 
up  on  his  hands  and  knees  to  the  palisading,  found  a  hole  in  it 
that  one  of  the  shells  had  made,  crept  through  the  hole  and 
up  to  the  flag,  and  got  it  and  got  away  with  it  without  being 
observed." 

Let  us  see  why  our  expedition  terminated  thus  abruptly. 

Weitzel  had  been  ordered  by  Butler  to  land  and  make  a 
reconnoissance.  In  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War  he  gave  his  experience  during  the  war  in 
charging  and  defending  field  works,  and  continuing,  said : 
"  After  that  experience,  with  the  information  I  had  obtained 
from  reading  and  study  —  for  before  this  war  I  was  an  instructor 
at  the  Military  Academy  for  three  years  under  Professor  Mahan, 
on  those  very  subjects  —  remembering  well  the  remarks  of  the 
Lieutenant  General  commanding,  that  it  was  his  intention  I 
should  command  that  expedition,  because  another  officer  selected 
by  the  war  department  had  once  shown  timidity,  and  in  face  of 
the  fact  that  I  had  been  appointed  a  major  general  only  twenty 
days  before,  and  needed  confirmation  ;  notwithstanding  all  this,  I 
went  back  to  General  Butler,  and  told  him  I  considered  it  would 
be  murder  to  order  an  attack  on  that  work  with  that  force." 

Colonel  Lamb  says,  in  reference  to  the  loss  of  his  flag  :  "  I 
had  no  fear  of  an  assault,  and  because,  during  a  bombardment 
which  rendered  an  assault  impossible,  I  covered  my  men,  and 
a  few  straggling  skirmishers,  too  few  to  attract  attention,  got 
near  the  fort,  and  some  gallant  officers  thought  they  could  have 
carried  the  work,  it  does  not  follow  that  they  would  not  have 
paid  dearly  for  their  temerity  if  they  had  made  the  attempt." 


278  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

General  Whiting  speaks  to  the  same  effect. 

Now,  who  is  to  say  that  Weitzel,  Whiting  and  Lamb  were 
mistaken  as  to  the  situation  that  day  ?  Is  it  the  brave  soldier, 
who  crept  unseen  through  a  hole  in  the  palisade  to  the  parapet 
and  took  a  flag  from  a  staff  which  had  been  shot  away  ? 

Is  it  Admiral  Porter,  who  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  January  17th,  1865:  "I  have  since  visited  Fort  Fisher 
and  the  adjoining  works,  and  find  their  strength  greatly  beyond 
what  I  had  conceived.  An  engineer  might  be  excusable  in 
saying  they  could  not  be  captured  except  by  regular  siege.  I 
wonder,  even  now,  how  it  was  done.  The  work,  as  I  said 
before,  is  really  stronger  than  the  Malakoff  tower,  which  defied 
so  long  the  combined  power  of  France  and  pngland."  In  a 
letter  of  the  16th  of  January  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  he 
says  :  "  I  was  in  Fort  Malakoff  a  few  days  after  it  surrendered 
to  the  French  and  English  ;  the  combined  armies  of  the  two 
nations  were  many  months  capturing  that  stronghold,  and  it 
won't  compare,  either  in  size  or  strength,  to  Fort  Fisher." 

I  have  no  hesitancy  in  saying  that  they  were  not  mistaken, 
though  it  is  true  that  without  personal  knowledge  of  the  charac- 
ter of  the  fort,  and,  for  the  time,  believing  Curtis,  I  ordered 
him  to  take  it  on  his  assertion  that  he  could  do  so. 

What  was  not  possible  December  25  th,  was  made  possible 
January  15th,  through  an  efficient  bombardment  on  the  part  of 
the  navy  and  the  co-operation  of  two  thousand  sailors  and 
marines  and  an  additional  force  of  one  thousand  four  hundred 
infantry. 

January  1st,  1865,  Grant  wrote  to  Secretary  Stanton:  "The 
fact  is,  there  are  but  two  ways  of  taking  Fort  Fisher,  operating 
from  the  water ;  one  is  to  surprise  them  whilst  there  is  but  a 
small  garrison  defending  the  place  ;  the  other  is  for  the  navy  to 
send  a  portion  of  their  fleet  into  Cape  Fear  River.  ..."  He 
continues  :  "  In  the  three  days  of  good  weather  which  elapsed 
after  the  army  had  reached  the  scene  of  action,  before  the  navy 
appeared,  our  troops  had  the  chance  of  capturing  Fort  Fisher 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    FORT   FISHER  279 

whilst  it  had  an  insufficient  garrison  to  hold  it.  The  delay  gave 
the  enemy  time  to  accumulate  a  force.  .  .  .  The  failure  before 
was  the  result  of  delays  by  the  navy." 

So,  of  Grant's  two  ways  of  taking  the  fort,  one  by  surprise 
failed,  as  he  said,  because  of  the  delay  of  the  navy,  and  as  to  the 
other,  Colonel  Comstock  reports  to  Grant,  January  9th  :  "  There 
is  no  hope,  at  least  at  present,  of  the  admiral's  trying  to  run  by 
Fort  Fisher." 

Grant  ordered  and  intended  that  Weitzel  should  have  com- 
mand of  the  expedition.  North  Carolina  was  in  Butler's  military 
department.     His  order  retained  Weitzel  as  his  subordinate. 

Though  Grant  may  have  intended  and  ordered  certain  action 
on  the  part  of  our  expedition  in  December,  1865,  on  the  first  of 
January,  1865,  he  wrote  the  Secretary  of  War,  as  just  quoted, 
that  there  were  but  two  ways  to  take  the  fort  —  by  surprise  or 
by  the  occupancy  of  the  river  by  the  navy.  There  was  no  sur- 
prise, the  navy  was  not  in  the  river,  the  bombardment  of  the 
fort  was  ineffectual,  Weitzel  decided  against  an  assault,  Butler 
acquiesced  and  ordered  the  expedition  back  to  Virginia,  saying 
to  Weitzel  at  the  same  time  that  he,  Butler,  would  assume  all 
responsibility,  as  he  could  stand  the  blame  better  than  could 
Weitzel,  the  professional  soldier. 

The  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  was  composed  of 
the  leading  men  in  Congress  at  that  time.  Much  experience 
in  the  investigation  of  military  affairs  had  made  them,  to  say  the 
least,  fairly  capable  judges.  They  could  command  any  witness, 
they  were  critical  and  severe  in  their  examinations,  and  their 
conclusions  were  reached  without  fear  or  favor.  Honest  Ben 
Wade  was  their  chairman.     This  is  their  decision : 

"  In  conclusion,  your  Committee  would  say,  from  all  the  testi- 
mony before  them,  that  the  determination  of  General  Butler  not 
to  assault  the  fort  seems  to  have  been  fully  justified  by  all  facts 
and  circumstances  then  known  or  afterwards  ascertained." 

Few  can  comprehend  the  penalty  General  Butler  had  to  pay 
for  his   action  on  this   occasion.     The  war   was  within  a  few 


280  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

months  of  its  end,  and  he  had  hoped  for  a  share  of  the  honors 
conferred  on  those  who  served  faithfully  and  well,  but  he  was 
sent  home,  and  the  whole  nation  condemned  him  for  the  failure. 
General  Weitzel,  one  of  the  best  of  men,  and  one  of  our  ablest 
generals,  was  humbled  in  spirit  before  the  storm  of  censure 
and  ridicule.  But  all  that  came  after  the  capture  of  the  fort  on 
our  second  expedition. 

PART    II. 

The  second  expedition  was  started  without  delay.  January 
2nd,  1865,  General  A.  H.  Terry  was  put  in  command.  On  the 
3rd  we  left  camp,  began  re-embarkation  on  the  4th,  and  com- 
pleted it  on  the  5  th.  / 

I  had  thirty-three  hundred  picked  men  in  my  division.  Gen- 
eral Paine  had  the  same  number  in  his.  There  were  added  a 
brigade  of  fourteen  hundred  men  under  Colonel  J.  G.  Abbott 
and  two  batteries  of  light  artillery  of  three  and  six  guns  each. 
Colonel  Comstock,  who  represented  Grant  on  our  first  expedi- 
tion, returned  with  us  on  the  second. 

The  transports  put  to  sea  on  the  morning  of  the  6th. 
A  severe  storm  drove  them  into  Beaufort. 

The  troops  were  landed  on  the  13th,  some  two  miles  north 
of  the  fort. 

Upon  landing  the  first  work  on  hand  was  to  establish  a  line 
of  breastworks  from  the  ocean  beach  to  the  river  to  keep  the 
enemy  in  the  direction  of  Wilmington  from  interfering  with  our 
operations. 

A  reconnoissance  was  made.  Terry  reports  :  "  As  a  result 
of  this  reconnoissance,  and  in  view  of  the  extreme  difficulty  which 
might  be  expected  in  landing  supplies  and  the  materials  for  a 
siege  on  the  often  tempestuous  beach,  it  was  decided  to  attempt 
an  assault  the  next  day,  provided  that,  in  the  mean  time,  the  fire 
of  the  navy  should  so  far  destroy  the  palisades  as  to  make  one 
practicable.  This  decision  was  communicated  to  Admiral  Porter, 
who  at  once  placed  a  division  of  his  vessels  in  a   position  to 


THE    CAPTURE    OF   FORT    FISHER  281 

accomplish  this  last-named  object.  It  was  arranged,  in  consul- 
tation with  him,  that  a  heavy  bombardment  from  all  the  vessels 
should  commence  early  in  the  morning  and  continue  up  to  the 
moment  of  the  assault,  and  that  even  then  it  should  not  cease, 
but  should  be  diverted  from  the  points  of  attack  to  the  other 
parts  of  the  work.  It  was  decided  that  the  assault  should  be 
made  at  3  p.m.,  that  the  army  should  attack  on  the  western  half 
of  the  land-face,  and  that  a  column  of  sailors  and  marines  should 
assault  the  northeast  bastion.  The  fire  of  the  navy  continued 
during  the  night.  At  8  a.m.  of  the  13th  all  of  the  vessels, 
except  a  division  left  to  aid  in  the  defence  of  our  northern  line, 
moved  into  position,  and  a  fire,  magnificent  alike  for  its  power 
and  accuracy,  was  opened,"  and  continued  all  day  Saturday, 
Saturday  night  and  Sunday,  till  3.30  p.m.  "Ames's  division  had 
been  selected  for  the  assault.  ...  At  3.25  p.m.  all  the  prep- 
arations were  completed,  the  order  to  move  forward  was  given  to 
Ames,  and  a  concerted  signal  was  made  to  Admiral  Porter  to 
change  the  direction  of  his  fire." 

The  situation  at  this  time  was  as  follows  :  Some  two  miles 
north  of  the  fort  General  Paine  had  established  a  line  of  breast- 
works, from  ocean  to  river,  facing  north,  with  his  own  division 
on  the  left  and  Colonel  Abbott's  brigade  on  the  right.  On  the 
sea-beach,  about  half  a  mile  from  the  fort,  were  two  thousand 
sailors  and  marines  under  command  of  Fleet  Captain  K.  R. 
Breese.  On  the  east  were  sixty-four  ships  of  war,  under  Admiral 
Porter,  cannonading  the  fort.  My  three  brigades  were  in  line, 
one  behind  the  other,  ranging  from  three  to  five  hundred  yards 
from  the  fort ;  the  left  of  each  line  nearly  opposite  the  middle 
of  the  land-face  of  the  fort,  the  right  near  the  river.  A  body  of 
sharpshooters  were  pushed  forward,  and  the  whole  division  was 
covered  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  as  far  as  possible,  by  the 
inequalities  of  the  ground  and  slight  pits  formed  by  throwing  up 
the  sand. 

Terry,  Comstock  and  I  were  in  a  small  advanced  outwork 
about  half  a  mile  from  the  fort.     My  able  and  gallant  Adjutant 


282  CIVIL   WAR    PAPERS 

General,  General  Charles  A.  Carleton,  has  made  the  following 
record  :  "  General  Terry  turned  to  General  Ames  and  said : 
'  General  Ames,  the  signal  agreed  upon  for  the  assault  has  been 
given.'  General  Ames  asked  :  '  Have  you  any  special  orders  to 
give  ? '  General  Terry  replied  :  '  No,  you  understand  the  situa- 
tion and  what  is  desired  to  be  accomplished.  I  leave  everything 
to  your  discretion.'  "  Thus  was  given  me  the  unrestricted 
command  of  the  fighting  forces. 

At  once  I  directed  Captain  Lawrence  of  my  staff  to  order 
Curtis,  commanding  the  First  Brigade,  to  charge,  striking  the 
parapet  at  the  end  nearest  the  river.  The  palisade  had  been 
sufficiently  broken  and  shot  away  by  the  fire  of  the  navy  to 
permit  the  passage  of  the  troops.  As  I  approached  the  fort  I 
watched  with  anxious  eyes  the  charge  of  the  First  Brigade. 

Captain  Lawrence  heroically  led  the  charge  of  that  part  of 
the  brigade  which  advanced  at  this  time.  He  was  the  first 
through  the  palisade,  and  while  reaching  for  a  guidon  to  plant 
on  the  first  traverse,  his  hand  was  shot  away  and  he  was  danger- 
ously wounded  in  the  neck,  but  with  this  lodgement  on  the  first 
traverse,  the  force  of  the  charge  was  spent.  I  quickly  ordered 
Colonel  Pennypacker's  brigade,  which  was  close  at  hand,  to 
charge  and  sweep  down  the  parapet  to  the  ocean. 

I  will  not  attempt  a  description  of  the  battle.  It  was  a 
charge  of  my  brigades,  one  after  the  other,  followed  by  desperate 
fighting  at  close  quarters  over  the  parapet  and  traverses  and  in 
and  through  the  covered  ways.  All  the  time  we  were  exposed 
to  the  musketry  and  artillery  of  the  enemy,  while  our  own  Navy 
was  thundering  away,  occasionally  making  us  the  victims  of  its 
fire. 

The  official  reports  of  my  officers  gave  no  adequate  idea  of 
their  gallant  deeds,  but  they  must  supply  the  form  and  coloring 
of  the  warlike  scenes  of  that  eventful  Sunday. 

Colonel  Daggett,  in  command  of  the  First  Brigade,  January 
17th,  reports :  "At  about  3  p.m.,  General  Curtis  having  received 
orders  to  that  effect  from  General  Ames,  through  Captain  Law- 


THE   CAPTURE    OF    FORT    FISHER  283 

rence,  the  brigade  advanced  to  the  charge,  so  as  to  strike  the 
sally-port,  that  having  been  deemed  the  only  vulnerable  point  of 
the  work,  and,  after  a  desperate  struggle,  the  advance  of  the 
brigade  reached  the  parapet  of  the  fort  and  scaled  it  to  the  first 
traverse,  where  the  guidon  of  the  1 1 7th  New  York  was  planted 
—  the  first  colors  on  the  fort." 

Major  O.  P.  Harding,  who  came  out  of  the  fight  in  command 
of  the  Second  Brigade,  reports  :  "  The  brigade  was  ordered  to 
assault  the  fort,  which  was  done  in  a  gallant  manner  and  under 
a  heavy  fire  of  grape  and  musketry,  and  entered  the  fort  through 
a  sally-port  near  the  river.  The  203rd  Pennsylvania,  com- 
manded by  Colonel  J.  W.  Moore,  was  the  first  to  enter  the  fort, 
closely  followed  by  the  97th  Pennsylvania,  commanded  by  First 
Lieutenant  John  Wainwright.  The  colors  of  each  of  those  regi- 
ments reached  the  parapet  about  the  same  time,  those  of  the 
97th  borne  by  Colonel  Pennypacker,  and  of  the  203rd  by  Colonel 
Moore.  Colonel  Pennypacker  was  seriously  wounded  while 
planting  his  colors  on  the  third  traverse,  and  Colonel  Moore  fell 
dead  while  passing  the  second  traverse,  waving  his  colors  and 
commanding  his  men  to  follow.  After  entering  the  fort  the 
brigade  became  somewhat  broken  up ;  nevertheless,  both  officers 
and  men  behaved  gallantly  until  its  capture." 

"  After  the  fall  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Lyman,  203rd  Penn- 
sylvania, who  fell  on  the  sixth  traverse,  I  commanded  the  regi- 
ment until  about  5  p.m.,  when  ordered  by  General  Ames  to 
take  command  of  the  brigade,  which  I  immediately  organized." 

Captain  H.  B.  Essington,  commanding  203rd  Pennsylvania, 
reports :  "  The  regiment  charged  on  the  right  of  the  Second 
Brigade,  and  was  the  first  regiment  of  the  brigade  to  enter  the 
fort,  going  in  with  the  First  (Curtis's)  Brigade.  After  having 
assisted  in  capturing  the  first  two  mounds,  a  portion  of  the  regi- 
ment went  to  the  right  and  stationed  themselves  behind  a  bank 
in  the  open  field  south  of  the  fort.  The  latter  portion  then 
charged  across  the  plain,  by  order  of  the  commanding  general 
(General  Ames),  until  opposite  the  seventh  or  eighth  traverse, 


284  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

where  they  threw  up  an  embankment  with  their  tin  plates  and 
shovels,  which  they  held  until  the  fort  surrendered,  keeping  up 
a  steady  fire  on  the  enemy." 

Let  me  say,  in  passing,  that  Colonel  Pennypacker's  conduct 
in  leading  his  brigade  with  the  colors  of  his  own  regiment, 
placed  him  second  to  none  for  gallantry  that  day.  It  would  be 
difficult  to  overestimate  the  value  of  his  example  to  his  brigade. 

Entering  the  fort  and  passing  to  the  rear  of  the  parapet  at 
the  west  end,  I  made  an  examination  of  it  from  that  position, 
and  decided  to  use  my  third  brigade,  Colonel  Bell's,  with  its 
left  by  the  parapet,  right  extended  south  and  west  inside  the 
fort,  and  charge  into  the  angle  formed  by  the  land  and  sea  faces. 
I  ordered  Bell  forward  with  his  brigade  to  report  to  me.  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Johnson,  commanding  the  Third  Brigade,  Jan- 
uary 1 9th,  reports  :  "  Colonel  Bell  was  ordered  by  General  Ames 
to  remain  near  him  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  orders,"  Un- 
fortunately Colonel  Bell  was  killed  in  the  advance,  gallantly 
leading  his  brigade.  The  part  of  his  brigade  which  reached  me 
was  in  a  somewhat  disorganized  condition.  I  formed  it  as  best 
I  could  for  the  charge.  Owing  to  the  obstructions  of  the  de- 
molished quarters  of  the  garrison  and  the  fire  of  the  enemy  from 
the  front  (the  angle  had  been  partially  filled  in  and  was  pro- 
tected by  a  curtain),  and  from  the  right,  as  well  as  the  fire  of 
our  Navy,  the  advance  was  checked.  The  men  were  in  a  very 
exposed  position,  and  as  no  advantage  could  be  gained  there  I 
ordered  them  to  join  the  other  troops  in  pushing  seaward  on  the 
land-face  of  the  fort.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Johnson  further  re- 
ports :  "The  brigade  entered  the  fort  conjointly  with  a  portion 
of  the  First  (Curtis's)  Brigade,  at  the  left  bastion,  a  portion 
moving  along  the  -terre-plain  and  a  portion  on  the  ramparts, 
parapets  and  slopes,  some  of  the  officers  and  men  in  the  advance 
with  officers  and  men  of  other  brigades,  all  vying  with  each 
other." 

Owing  to  the  contracted  space  in  which  the  fighting  was 
done,  brigade  and  regimental  formations  were  impossible.    What 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    FORT    FISHER  285 

was  accomplished  was  through  the  heroic  efforts  of  small  bodies 
of  officers  and  men. 

From  time  to  time  I  sent  to  Terry,  who  was  in  the  earthwork 
half  a  mile  away,  reports  of  the  progress  I  was  making. 

I  had  previously  learned  that  the  sailors  and  marines  who 
had  made  an  attack  on  the  sea  angle  had  been  quickly  repulsed. 

As  the  sun  sank  to  the  horizon,  the  ardor  of  the  assault 
abated.  Our  advance  was  but  slow.  Ten  of  my  officers  had 
been  killed,  forty-seven  wounded,  and  about  five  hundred  men 
were  killed  and  wounded.  Among  the  killed  was  one  brigade 
commander,  the  other  two  were  wounded  and  disabled.  I  now 
requested  Terry  to  join  me  in  the  fort.  It  was  dark  before  he 
and  Comstock  arrived.      I  explained  the  situation. 

Colonel  Abbott's  brigade,  which  had  been  relieved  from  its 
position  in  the  line  facing  Wilmington,  by  the  defeated  sailors 
and  marines,  had  been  ordered  to  report  to  me. 

I  decided  to  make  my  chief  effort  with  the  reinforcements 
by  moving  the  troops  by  the  flank  between  the  palisade  and  the 
foot  of  the  fort  until  the  head  of  the  column  should  reach  the 
northeast  angle  by  the  ocean,  then  face  to  the  right  and  rush 
the  men  up  and  over  the  parapet ;  and  at  the  same  time  continue 
the  struggle  for  the  traverses.  Colonel  J.  C.  Abbott,  command- 
ing Second  Brigade,  First  Division,  in  his  report  of  January 
1 5th,  says :  "  Reaching  the  fort  about  dark  I  reported  to 
General  Ames.  By  order  of  General  Ames  I  first  threw  the 
3rd  New  Hampshire  Volunteers,  Captain  Trickey  commanding, 
along  the  portion  of  the  north  face  of  the  work  already  occupied 
by  his  troops  and  relieved  them  ;  also  by  General  Ames's  order, 
I  threw  out  the  7th  Connecticut  Volunteers,  Captain  Marble 
commanding,  as  a  picket  in  rear  of  the  work,  the  right  of  the 
line  resting  on  Cape  Fear  River.  During  this  time  the  enemy 
occupied  all  the  eastern  and  about  one-third  the  northern  face 
of  the  work.  At  about  9  o'clock,  by  order  of  General  Ames, 
I  then  proceeded  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  the  remainder  of 
the  fort.     I  then  advanced  the  7th  New  Hampshire,  Lieutenant 


286  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

Colonel  Rollins  commanding.  They  at  once  and  gallantly 
charged  up  the  slope  enveloping  the  sea  angle  of  the  work, 
meeting  a  sharp  fire  from  the  enemy,  who  were  stationed  behind 
the  parapets,  and  in  rear  of  the  main  work." 

Captain  William  H.  Trickey,  commanding  3rd  New  Hamp- 
shire Regiment,  reports  January  1 8th :  "  I  was  directed  by 
Colonel  Abbott,  commanding  brigade,  to  move  my  regiment  to 
the  extreme  advance  held  by  the  Second  Division  and  open  fire 
upon  the  enemy  ;  was  thus  engaged  for  nearly  an  hour,  having, 
to  a  great  extent,  silenced  the  enemy's  fire ;  was  then  directed 
by  Colonel  Abbott  to  take  and  hold,  with  twenty  men,  the  next 
traverse  in  front,  the  remainder  of  my  command  being  left  in 
several  traverses  to  keep  up  the  fire  upon  the  enemy.  We 
took  the  traverse,  as  directed,  driving  the  enemy  out.  Think- 
ing we  could  go  farther,  we  charged  and  took  the  next  two, 
with  a  like  result.  After  taking  the  third  traverse,  having  met 
with  considerable  resistance,  I  did  not  deem  it  prudent  to  go 
farther  with  so  few  men,  and  opened  a  vigorous  fire  upon  the 
enemy,  who  was  rallying  for  the  recapture  of  the  traverses  ;  we 
held  the  enemy  in  check  until  the  arrival  of  the  7th  New  Hamp- 
shire and  6th  Connecticut,  who  charged  and  took  the  remainder 
of  the  work." 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Rollins  reports:  "At  10  p.  m.  moved 
my  regiment  inside  the  fort,  and  was  ordered  by  General  Ames 
to  take  two  traverses,  and  three,  if  possible,  the  number  not 
then  taken.  I  moved  over  the  third  traverse  of  the  fort,  and 
advanced  rapidly  inside  the  stockade  until  I  reached  the  battery 
on  the  northeast  angle  of  the  fort,  where  I  formed  the  right 
wing  of  the  regiment,  leaving  the  left  in  support.  I  then 
ordered  a  charge  and  captured  the  three  remaining  traverses 
and  batteries,  then  pushed  on  by  the  right  flank,  and  by  so 
doing  cut  off  the  angle  of  the  fort,  moved  to  the  right,  and  by  a 
rapid  and  determined  advance,  captured  the  remaining  traverses 
and  batteries  of  the  fort  proper." 

Thus,  after  some   seven  hours'  fighting,  more  than  five  of 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    FORT    FISHER  287 

which  were  after  dark,  the  land-face  of  the  fort  was  occupied 
and  all  resistance  ceased.  The  enemy  fled  to  the  shelter  of 
Battery  Buchanan,  at  the  end  of  the  point,  two  miles  away. 
Terry  took  Abbott  and  a  part  of  his  brigade  and  marched  to 
Battery  Buchanan.  Abbott  reports :  "  I  was  met  by  the 
Adjutant  General  of  the  General  commanding  the  enemy's 
forces,  who  tendered  the  surrender  of  the  battery,  upon  which 
I  referred  to  General  Terry,  who  would  soon  arrive.  .  .  . 
General  Terry  having  arrived,  received  the  surrender  of  the 
work  and  the  force." 

Colonel  Abbott  was  mistaken.  Terry  was  too  late.  Captain 
Lockwood  of  my  staff  had  already  received  the  surrender. 

It  was  after  ten  o'clock.  The  task  set  for  us  at  half-past 
three  was  finished.     Our  work  was  done. 

The  statement  of  their  achievement  is  the  highest  eulogy 
that  can  be  passed  upon  our  soldiers. 

A  grievous  accident  occurred  early  the  next  morning,  which 
killed  and  wounded  one  hundred  and  thirty  of  our  gallant  heroes. 
It  was  the  explosion  of  the  magazine  of  the  fort.  A  board  of 
enquiry  was  organized  and  found,  "that  the  following  are  the 
main  facts,  viz.  :  1,  immediately  after  the  capture  of  the  fort, 
General  Ames  gave  orders  to  Lieutenant  Colonel  Samuel  M. 
Zent  to  place  guards  on  all  the  magazines  and  bomb-proofs. 
2,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Zent  commenced  on  the  northwest  corner 
of  the  fort,  next  the  river,  following  the  traverses  round,  and 
placed  guards  on  thirty-one  entrances  under  the  traverses.  The 
main  magazines,  which  afterwards  exploded,  being  in  the  rear  of 
the  traverses,  escaped  his  notice,  and,  consequently,  had  no 
guards  from  his  regiment  or  any  other." 

General  Bragg  reports  that  the  defenders  of  the  fort  num- 
bered, all  told,  about  one  hundred  and  ten  commissioned  officers 
and  twenty-five  hundred  men  —  their  casualties  being  over  four 
hundred.  A  few  escaped  across  the  river,  in  boats,  under  cover 
of  the  darkness  ;  the  rest  became  our  prisoners. 

Mr.  Stanton,  the  Secretary  of  War,  had  been  visiting  Sher- 


288  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

man  at  Savannah  after  his  march  through  Georgia,  and  on  his 
way  north  called  at  Fort  Fisher,  where  he  had  an  interview  with 
Terry. 

Upon  Stanton's  arrival  at  Fortress  Monroe,  Va.,  he  sent  a 
despatch  to  President  Lincoln  marked  "official,"  dated  Tuesday, 
io  a.m.,  January  17,  1865.  In  this  despatch  Stanton  mentions 
Terry,  my  brigade  commanders  and  some  regimental  com- 
manders, but  omits  my  name  altogether.  Among  other  things 
he  says  :  "  The  assault  on  the  other  and  most  difficult  side  of 
the  fort  was  made  by  a  column  of  three  thousand  troops  of  the 
old  Tenth  Corps,  led  by  Colonel  Curtis,  under  the  immediate 
supervision  of  General  Terry." 

This  is  not  true,  as  the  official  reports  show,  in  any  other 
sense  than  that  Curtis's  brigade  first  reached  the  fort  under 
my  immediate  orders  with  Terry  half  a  mile  away.  An  earlier 
attempt  to  make  public  these  facts  has  been  impracticable,  as 
the  volume  of  the  war  records  covering  this  event  was  not 
published  till  1894. 

With  this  as  a  preface  I  will  add  to  the  extracts  of  the 
reports  of  some  of  my  subordinate  officers  already  given,  the 
report  of  General  Terry,  who  was  my  only  superior  officer.  He 
says  :  "  Of  General  Ames  I  have  already  spoken  in  a  letter 
recommending  his  promotion.  He  commanded  all  the  troops 
engaged  and  was  constantly  under  fire.  His  great  coolness, 
good  judgment  and  skill  were  never  more  conspicuous  than  in 
this  assault." 

These  official  reports  show,  as  Terry  says,  that  I  "com- 
manded all  the  troops  engaged  "  from  the  first  act,  when  my 
aide,  Captain  A.  G.  Lawrence,  led  the  first  brigade  into  the  fort, 
to  the  last  act,  when  the  garrison  surrendered  to  my  aide, 
Captain  H.  C.  Lockwood. 

The  sailors  and  marines  who  assaulted  in  column  the  north- 
east angle  of  the  fort  along  the  sea  beach,  were  a  body  of  two 
thousand  men,  made  up  of  detachments  from  different  ships. 
Naturally  enough,  Captain  Breese  found  it,  as  has  been  stated, 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    FORT    FISHER  289 

an  unwieldy  mass.  The  sixteen  hundred  sailors  were  armed 
only  with  pistols  and  cutlasses.  They  were  quickly  repulsed. 
Few  reached  the  parapet.  Once  checked,  they  turned  and  fled, 
losing  three  hundred  in  killed  and  wounded.  Admiral  Porter 
testified  :  "  I  suppose  the  whole  thing  was  over  in  fifteen  minutes, 
as  far  as  the  sailors  were  concerned,  for  they  were  cut  down  like 
sheep." 

Later,  this  force  was  sent  to  the  line  of  intrenchments  facing 
Wilmington,  relieving  Colonel  Abbott's  brigade,  which  reported 
to  me.  Of  course  Admiral  Porter  expected  his  sailors  to  carry 
the  fort,  but,  alas  !  he  had  been  deceived  as  to  its  defensive 
capabilities,  which  deception  resulted  in  the  apparently  needless 
sacrifice  of  his  gallant  sailors. 

Our  Navy,  in  its  ships  and  armament,  was  the  most  powerful 
that  ever  existed  up  to  that  time.  In  officers  and  men  it  never 
had  its  equal,  and  never  will  till  an  equally  enlightened,  powerful 
and  liberty-loving  people  again  rise,  in  their  might,  in  a  struggle 
for  self-preservation. 

As  to  the  effect  on  the  fort  of  the  second  bombardment, 
Colonel  Lamb  writes  :  "  The  land  armament,  with  palisades  and 
torpedoes,  had  been  destroyed.  For  the  first  time  in  the  his- 
tory of  sieges  the  land  defences  of  the  works  were  destroyed, 
not  by  the  act  of  the  besieging  army,  but  by  the  concentrated 
fire,  direct  and  enfilading,  of  an  immense  fleet,  poured  upon 
them  without  intermission,  until  torpedo  wires  were  cut,  palisades 
breached  so  that  they  actually  afforded  cover  for  assailants,  and 
the  slopes  of  the  work  were  rendered  practicable  for  assault." 

Why  the  first  expedition  was  a  failure  and  the  second  a 
success  has  never  been  rightly  understood.  The  military  situa- 
tions have  been  obscured  by  the  contention  between  General 
Butler  and  Admiral  Porter,  though  the  most  amicable  relations 
existed  between  the  army  and  navy. 

It  has  been  believed  that  the  fort  was  in  the  same  condition 
on  both  occasions,  and  that  it  was  but  poorly  garrisoned  on  the 
first.     Those  who  so  held  were  in  error  in  both  particulars. 


290  CIVIL  WAR   PAPERS 

According  to  Badeau,  Grant's  historian  :  "  Curtis  declared 
that  the  fort  could  have  been  carried  on  the  first  expedition,  and 
that  at  the  moment  when  they  were  recalled  they  virtually  had 
possession."     This  declaration  has  been  accepted  as  the  truth. 

We  can  examine  the  facts,  now  that  the  official  reports  have 
been  published,  and  form  our  own  opinions  on  this  point,  which 
has  been  the  pivot  of  the  whole  controversy. 

It  appears  from  Curtis's  report  that  he  had  "pushed  the 
right  of  his  skirmishers  to  within  seventy-five  paces  of  the  fort 
and  had  sent  back  to  his  reserves  for  two  hundred  men  with 
which  to  possess  the  fort,  but  his  messenger  was  there  informed 
that  orders  from  the  department  commander  bade  him  retire," 
which  he  did. 

Let  us  see  what  these  two  hundred  men  would  have  had  to 
do  to  make  what  Curtis  calls  a  "virtual,"  an  actual  possession  of 
the  fort. 

Colonel  Lamb  had  a  force  of  fourteen  hundred  men,  nine 
hundred  of  whom  were  veterans.  Whiting,  Lamb  and  other 
officers  commend  the  discipline,  skill  and  gallantry  of  the  gar- 
rison. I  will  not  take  time  to  quote  from  their  reports.  They 
all  show  that  the  officers  of  the  fort  were  keenly  alive  to  our 
movements.  Colonel  Lamb  states  that  he  intentionally  kept 
his  men  hidden  from  view.  He  was  perfectly  familiar  with  the 
surroundings,  both  within  and  without  the  fort. 

Now,  the  one  question  to  decide  is,  could  those  two  hundred 
men,  sent  for  by  Curtis,  have  taken  possession  of  that  palisaded 
Malakoff  fortress,  with  its  garrison  of  fourteen  hundred  men  ? 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Barney,  who  commanded  our  forces 
behind  the  picket  line,  nowhere  intimates  that  we  had  any  kind 
of  possession  of  the  fort. 

Even  Curtis  reports,  officially,  that  his  skirmishers  were  met 
with  musketry  and  canister,  and  that  he  retired  under  a  heavy 
fire. 

In  making  a  decision,  Lamb's  report  must  not  be  overlooked. 
He  reports  :  "That  it  was  dark  at  5.30,  when  the  fleet  ceased 


THE   CAPTURE    OF   FORT   FISHER  291 

firing.  No  assault  could  be  made  while  the  fleet  was  firing. 
When  the  firing  ceased  the  parapets  (which  were  twenty  feet 
high)  were  at  once  manned  and  half  of  the  garrison  (seven  hun- 
dred men)  were  stationed  outside  the  work  behind  the  palisade, 
which  was  nine  feet  high  and  pierced  for  musketry."  What 
soldier  will  say  we  had  "virtual"  possession  of  the  fort  under 
such  circumstances  ? 

The  second  expedition  took  this  question  from  the  realm  of 
speculation. 

Three  weeks  after  the  first  attempt  we  were  back  again 
before  the  fort,  which,  because  of  the  efficient  bombardment  of 
the  Navy,  was  far  less  capable  of  resistance.  A  column  of  two 
thousand  sailors  and  marines  were  to  make  a  gallant  assault  on 
the  sea  angle  simultaneously  with  ours,  thereby  to  create  a 
diversion,  greatly  to  our  advantage. 

Curtis  had  in  his  brigade,  now  forming  the  first  line,  more 
than  twice  as  many  men  as  he  had  before  the  fort  on  the  first 
expedition.  Again  I  gave  him  the  order  to  take  the  fort.  Did 
he  take  it  ?  No.  His  brigade,  led  by  Captain  Lawrence,  made 
a  lodgment  on  one  corner  of  it  —  a  lodgment  so  uncertain  that 
I  immediately  ordered  up  Colonel  Pennypacker's  brigade,  which, 
inspired  and  led  by  him  and  Colonel  Moore,  reached  the  third 
traverse  and  made  our  foothold  secure.  Such  are  the  official 
records  of  the  battle. 

I  wish  to  touch  one  other  point.  Badeau  writes  in  this  same 
history  :  "  The  fighting  was  continued  from  traverse  to  traverse, 
until  at  9  o'clock  the  troops  had  nearly  reached  the  bastion. 
Bell  had  been  killed  and  Pennypacker  wounded,  and  Curtis  now 
sent  back  for  reinforcements.  The  advance  party  was  in 
imminent  peril,  for  the  guns  from  both  bastions  and  the  mound 
batteries  were  turned  upon  them.  At  this  crisis  a  staff  officer 
brought  orders  from  Terry  to  stop  fighting  and  begin  intrench- 
ing. Curtis  was  inflamed  with  the  magnificent  rage  of  battle, 
and  fairly  roared  at  this  command,  '  Then  we  shall  lose  whatever 
we  have  gained.     The  enemy  will  drive  us  from  here  in  the 


292  CIVIL   WAR   PAPERS 

morning.'  While  he  spoke  he  was  struck  by  a  shell,  and  fell 
senseless  to  the  earth.  The  hero  of  Fort  Fisher  had  fallen,  and 
the  fort  was  not  yet  carried.  Ames,  who  was  near  him,  sent  an 
officer  to  Terry  to  report  that  Curtis  was  killed,  and  that  his 
dying  request  was  that  the  fighting  might  go  on.  It  was  also 
Ames's  opinion  that  the  battle  should  proceed.  Terry  caught 
the  contagion,  and  determined  to  continue  the  assault,  even  if  it 
became  necessary  to  abandon  the  line  of  defence  towards  Wil- 
mington. Abbott's  reinforcements  were  at  once  ordered  for- 
ward, and  as  they  entered  the  fort  the  rebels  on  the  bastion  gave 
way  and  Fort  Fisher  was  carried."  It  is  due  to  Badeau  to  state 
that  he  says  in  a  note  that  he  "obtained  the  account  of  this 
assault  from  a  paper  written  by  an  aide-de-camp  to  General 
Curtis." 

This  remarkable  statement  deserves  a  moment's  considera- 
tion. If  it  be  true,  then  all  the  chief  honors  must  fall  on  one 
head.  But  it  is  not  true.  If  Terry  gave  orders  to  stop  fight- 
ing and  begin  intrenching,  who  can  believe  that  it  was  through 
the  "  contagion  caught  "  by  him  from  Curtis  that  the  fight 
continued,  or  that  he  would  "abandon  the  line  towards  Wil- 
mington "  to  try  uncertainties  at  the  fort  ? 

Terry  reports  :  "  When  Bell's  brigade  was  ordered  into 
action  I  foresaw  that  more  troops  would  probably  be  needed, 
and  sent  an  order  for  Abbott's  brigade  to  move  down  from  the 
north  line,  at  the  same  time  requesting  Captain  Breese  to 
replace  them  with  his  sailors  and  marines.  I  also  directed 
General  Paine  to  send  me  one  of  the  strongest  regiments  of 
his  own  division ;  these  troops  arrived  at  dusk  and  reported  to 
General  Ames. " 

This  treatment  of  Terry  and  the  ignoring  of  division, 
brigade  and  regimental  commanders  find  no  justification  in  the 
facts.  Terry  is  entitled  to  every  honor  due  his  position. 
Pennypacker  and  Bell  cannot  be  swept  aside  so  lightly,  nor 
the  regimental  commanders,  whose  names  I  need  not  give 
here. 


THE   CAPTURE    OF   FORT   FISHER  293 

I  would  say  specifically  to  that  reference  to  myself,  that  I 
did  not  send  any  request,  "  dying "  or  other,  from  Curtis  to 
Terry  that  the  fighting  might  go  on. 

If  Terry  intended  my  division  to  stop  fighting  and  begin 
intrenching  he  did  not  send  the  order  to  Curtis,  one  of  my 
brigade  commanders,  nor  would  Terry  send  reinforcements  to 
Curtis  over  my  head. 

According  to  this  aide,  Curtis  was  wounded  at  9  o'clock 
while  criticising  Terry's  order  to  stop  fighting  and  begin 
intrenching.  I  say  in  my  report  that  Curtis  was  wounded  "a 
short  time  before  dark  "  on  that  brief  winter's  day. 

I  saw  him  in  and  emerge  from  a  covered  way  at  the  west 
end  of  the  parapet.  He  approached  me  and  began  to  speak  ; 
almost  at  the  same  time  a  shot  struck  him  down.  Colonel 
Daggett,  who  succeeded  to  the  command  of  Curtis's  brigade, 
reports  two  days  after  :  Curtis  was  seriously  wounded  about 
4.30.  General  Carleton,  who  was  with  me  at  the  time,  and 
picked  up  his  sword  as  he  fell,  says  Curtis  was  shot  at  about 
4.30. 

And  yet  Badeau  would  have  us  believe  that  Curtis  was 
wounded  while  criticising  Terry's  order  to  stop  fighting  and 
begin  intrenching,  at  9  o'clock,  some  four  hours  after  Curtis  fell 
senseless  at  my  feet. 

In  fact,  he  was  wounded  before  dark,  about  an  hour  and  a 
half  after  the  battle  began,  and  some  four  hours  before  the  fort 
was  taken.  The  exact  minute  is  of  no  importance.  Partici- 
pants in  a  battle  are  poor  judges  of  passing  time. 

In  this  instance  it  is  fixed  accurately  enough  in  the  official 
reports  of  Daggett,  Abbott  and  myself,  as  well  as  Carleton's 
statement  of  his  recollections. 

General  Terry  says  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle : 
"Brigadier  General  Curtis  and  Colonels  Pennypacker,  Bell  and 
Abbott,  the  brigade  commanders,  led  them  with  the  utmost 
gallantry.  Curtis  was  wounded  after  fighting  in  the  front  rank, 
rifle  in  hand ;  Pennypacker  while  carrying  the  standard  of  one 


294  CIVIL   WAR   PAPERS 

of  his  regiments,  the  first  man  in  a  charge  over  a  traverse  ;  Bell 
was  mortally  wounded  near  the  palisade."' 

This  is  all,  literally  all,  Terry  says  of  exceptional  services  by 
Curtis.  "Fighting  in  the  front  rank,  rifle  in  hand"  is  most 
commendable  under  the  circumstances,  but  it  does  not  in  itself 
justify  claims  for  exceptional  honors. 

My  report  says  :  "  The  conduct  of  the  officers  and  men  of 
this  division  was  most  gallant.  .  .  .  Where  the  name  of  every 
officer  and  man  engaged  in  this  desperate  conflict  should  be 
submitted,  I  shall  at  present  only  be  able  to  give  a  few  of  those 
most  conspicuous.     It  is  hoped  all  may  be  properly  rewarded. 

"Brevet  Brig.  General  N.  M.  Curtis,  commanding  First 
Brigade,  was  prominent  throughout  the  day  for  his  bravery,  cool- 
ness and  judgment.  His  services  cannot  be  overestimated.  He 
fell  a  short  time  before  dark,  seriously  wounded  in  the  head  by 
a  canister  shot. 

"  Colonel  Pennypacker,  commanding  the  Second  Brigade, 
was  seriously  wounded  while  planting  his  colors  on  the  third 
traverse  of  the  work.  This  officer  was  surpassed  by  none,  and 
his  absence  during  the  day  was  most  deeply  felt  and  seriously 
regretted. 

"  Colonel  L.  Bell,  commanding  Third  Brigade,  was  mortally 
wounded  while  crossing  the  bridge  in  advance  of  the  palisading. 
He  was  an  able  and  efficient  officer ;  one  not  easily  replaced. 

"  Colonel  J.  W.  Moore,  203rd  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  be- 
haved with  the  most  distinguished  gallantry.  He  was  killed 
while  passing  the  second  traverse  of  the  fort,  in  advance  of  his 
regiment,  waving  his  colors.  Few  equalled,  none  surpassed 
this  brave  officer." 

My  report  on  Curtis  is  not  less  generous  than  Terry's ;  but 
it  was  not  intended  to,  and  I  doubt  if  it  does,  sustain  his  pre- 
tensions of  this  day. 

The  official  records,  written  thirty-two  years  ago,  must  be 
the  foundation  for  all  claims  of  honor  and  distinction.  Nothing 
can  now  be  added  to  them  or  taken  from  them.  By  them  we 
all  must  be  judged. 


THE    CAPTURE    OF    FORT    FISHER  295 

Misrepresentations  greatly  injured  General  Butler,  and  deeply 
humiliated  General  Weitzel.  Truth  has  been  outraged  —  truth 
overslow  in  the  pursuit  of  falsehood,  not  always  the  most  agree- 
able company. 

In  this  paper  I  have  attempted  to  right  a  wrong.  I  have 
given  few  opinions  of  my  own.  I  have  called  up  the  actors 
themselves,  and  have  let  them  speak  in  their  own  words  —  some- 
times under  oath  —  always  under  a  sense  of  grave  responsibility. 

[The  writer  wishes  to  state  to  those  who  heard  the  paper  read  before  the 
Commanderies  of  the  Loyal  Legion  of  the  States  of  Massachusetts,  November  4th, 
1896,  and  New  York,  February  3rd,  1897,  that,  in  the  accompanying  pamphlet,  in 
which  it  is  reproduced,  he  has  omitted  reference  to  the  time  when  a  flag  was  cap- 
tured and  the  time  and  place  a  Lieutenant  was  made  a  prisoner,  and  also  as  to 
having  heard  of  and  from  General  Curtis. 

This  has  been  done  because  the  accuracy  of  these  statements  has  been  ques- 
tioned, and  also  because,  accurate  or  inaccurate,  they  are  immaterial  to  the  issues 
involved. 

He  prefers  to  stand  on  the  official  records  made  at  the  time  and  not  on  recol- 
lections after  a  period  of  thirty-two  years. 

If,  however,  any  of  his  hearers  offers  the  slightest  objection  to  this  action, 
whatever  the  motive,  the  writer  is  quite  willing  to  be  held  to  the  text  as  read.] 


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51  EMPIRE  ST. 
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